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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Internet of Things (IoT), heterogeneous devices
connect to each other and to external systems to exchange
data and provide services. Given the diversity of devices, it
is becoming increasingly common to establish collaborative
relationships between devices to provide composite services.
However, due to the high degree of heterogeneity in the IoT
context, one of the most significant challenges is to develop
software applications that can run on a wide variety of devices
and can communicate and collaborate with an even wider array
of systems. A common middleware infrastructure for these
devices will therefore have a significant impact on the design,
deployment, and use of services in IoT systems by allowing
developers to focus on the applications rather than the low-
level implementation details each device. Spiess et al. [1] have
proposed and demonstrated a middleware architecture for IoT
systems based on the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)
paradigm which is well suited to supporting heterogeneous
devices and communication technologies. Their architecture
uses multiple layers to hide the underlying complexity and
heterogeneity of the IoT hardware, software, and protocols All
communication takes place via standardized web-services.
In their architecture, Spiess et al. [1] define a single
security layer and provide a brief description of the intended
functionality of this layer. However, we argue that security
is a key requirement of any IoT system and that there are
significant benefits of integrating security throughout the whole
middleware architecture. Furthermore, we suggest that the
concept of trust is also critical to the widespread adoption
of this type of middleware for IoT systems. In order to
achieve these objectives, we propose an enhanced version of
the middleware architecture by Spiess et al. [1] in which
security and trust are integrated throughout the architecture,
rather than being confined to a single layer.
II. SECURITY AND TRUST IN IOT
Security is critical for almost every IoT system, and in
the last few years we have witnessed many stark examples of
security breaches in smart devices [2][3]. Policy-based security
models are a well-understood means of enforcing security
policies within systems. For example, modern mobile devices
running Android or iOS use policy-based security models for
all applications. In order to manage the wide range of services
available in the IoT context, our architecture provides a similar
type of security model for IoT devices. Similarly to the mobile
devices, our security model ensures that an application is only
able to access device features and services for which it has
permission and thus cannot interfere with other applications.
Our architecture also provides the property of trustworthi-
ness, which we view as a complementary property to security:
on the one hand, security aims to ensure that the middleware
and the underlying devices are protected from malicious ap-
plications and external adversaries. On the other hand, these
devices and the middleware must provide suitable guarantees
of their trustworthiness to both applications and users before
they can be used in certain types of systems, especially those in
which there are privacy or safety considerations. We provide a
mechanism through which applications can establish the trust-
worthiness of the middleware and verify its properties before
using it. In this paper we focus specifically on the security and
trust mechanisms for applications and middleware. Although
there are further considerations with regard to security and
trust in individual devices, these are left as future work.
III. ENHANCED ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows our enhanced architecture as an adaptation
of the architecture presented by Spiess et al. [1]. In their
architecture security is presented in one layer whereas we
show how security and trust mechanisms should be integrated
throughout the architecture. The original architecture is shown
in yellow with our enhancements presented in green.
A. Security
Policy Management: The policy management component
facilitates adding, removing and modifying policies in the
system. The owner or user of the system can manage the
policies through this interface. The implementation of this
interface is specific to each system.
Security Policy Engine: The security policy engine is the
main policy component of the system. It contains the system-
wide policy database in which the security rules are stored. It
also contains the central policy decision point (PDP). The PDP
receives information about the application (e.g. application
ID, signature and parameters) and uses this to make policy
decisions based on the rules in the database. These decisions
are passed to the relevant policy enforcement points.
Device Policy Enforcement (DPE): This component is
responsible for enforcing the decisions from the PDP whenever
an application is dealing with a specific device. For example,
Spiess et al. [1] have demonstrated how their architecture
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Fig. 1: Enhanced Middleware Architecture (adapted from [1])
could be used on a robotic arm. However, for safety reasons,
a sensing application may only have permission to read the
position of the arm but not to move it. The DPE would allow
access to the position data but deny any requests from that
application to move the arm.
Service Policy Enforcement (SPE): This component per-
forms a similar function to the DPE component but deals with
composite services rather than individual device capabilities.
For example, the security policy could mandate that any device
which has access to sensitive information must not have direct
access to the Internet. This type of service-level policy would
be enforced by the SPE component.
B. Trust
Device Identification: The device identification compo-
nent is responsible for identifying devices in the system
to guarantee that only legitimate devices are used by the
middleware and applications.
Attestation: At each layer in the architecture, attestation
is used to provide a guarantee to the application that the
middleware it is using is trusted. Theoretically, each layer in
the middleware can be hosted in a different location, but from
a security point of view, this makes it harder to ensure that
all hosting devices are trusted. The application would like a
guarantee that the middleware hosted in all devices is trusted
and thus attestation is necessary. In order to hide the lower
layers from the developer, each component in the middleware
should be able to make trust decision about the components
with which it communicates and communicate this decision
up the stack to the Application Interface.
IV. EXAMPLES
We present two hypothetical scenarios, based on the
demonstration by Spiess et al. [1], to illustrate the necessity
of our security and trust enhancements. In their demonstration
system, a robotic arm is operating a manufacturing process and
a sensor is checking that the vibration is within acceptable
limits. As a hypothetical extension, consider a web-based
efficiency monitoring application that uses the middleware to
monitor the position of the robotic arm. Without fine-grained
device policy enforcement, this application might not only have
access to the position of the arm but might also be able to
move it. Since it is Internet-connected, this application might
become compromised. This supposed monitoring application
could then be used in a denial of service attack by introducing
small vibrations in the arm at exactly the right frequency
to trigger the vibration sensor and halt the process. Our
enhancements would mitigate this in two ways: 1) fine-grained
policy enforcement at the DPE would prevent the monitoring
application from moving the arm and 2) the SPE could enforce
mutual exclusion between Internet-connectivity and permission
to control the robotic arm. As an example of the need for trust
in the middleware and devices, consider the emergency stop
button. The application expects that this signal is always a
real event and therefore stops the process. However, untrusted
middleware could falsify this signal causing the process to stop
for no reason. Due to safety concerns, ignoring this signal is
not an option. Our enhancements would mitigate this attack
by using strong device identities and attestation so that the
application can always make an informed decision based on
the trustworthiness of the underlying system.
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